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Abstract: This research examines the impacts of the Swiss reform of the allocation of tasks 
which was accepted in 2004 and implemented in 2008 to “re-assign” the responsibilities 
between the federal government and the cantons. The public tasks were redistributed, 
according to the leading and fundamental principle of subsidiarity. Seven tasks came under 
exclusive federal responsibility; ten came under the control of the cantons; and twenty-two 
“common tasks” were allocated to both the Confederation and the cantons. For these common 
tasks it wasn’t possible to separate the management and the implementation. In order to deal 
with nineteen of them, the reform introduced the conventions-programs (CPs), which are public 
law contracts signed by the Confederation with each canton. These CPs are generally valid for 
periods of four years (2008-11, 2012-15 and 2016-19, respectively). The third period is currently 
being prepared. By using the principal-agent theory I examine how contracts can improve 
political relations between a principal (Confederation) and an agent (canton). I also provide a 
first qualitative analysis by examining the impacts of these contracts on the vertical cooperation 
and on the implication of different actors by focusing my study on five CPs - protection of 
cultural heritage and conservation of historic monuments, encouragement of the integration of 
foreigners, economic development, protection against noise and protection of the nature and 
landscape - applied in five cantons, which represents twenty-five cases studies.  
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Introduction 
This article analyzes the impact of task allocation reform on the vertical cooperation 
between the Swiss federal government and the cantons. This reform, which was 
accepted on 28 November 2004 by sixty-four percent of the people and twenty and one-
half cantons and implemented in 2008, is arguably the most significant reform of Swiss 
federalism since its inception. The aims of the reform are to “re-assign” the 
responsibilities between the federal government and the cantons, and to make the 
implementation of public policies financially more efficient, under the so-called “new 
equalization scheme” (“Neuer Finanzausgleich”; NFA). The public tasks were 
redistributed, according to the leading and fundamental principle of subsidiarity1. 
Enacted were twenty-seven changes in constitutional articles and more than thirty 
modifications of laws (Braun, 2009). Seven tasks came under exclusive federal 
responsibility; ten came under the control of the cantons; and twenty-two “common 
tasks” were allocated to both the Confederation and the cantons. For these common 
tasks, it wasn’t possible to separate the management and the implementation. In order 
to deal with nineteen of them, the reform introduced the Conventions-Programs (CPs), 
which are public law contracts signed by the Confederation with each canton, based on 
the provision of global or block grants. These CPs are generally valid for periods of four 
years (2008-11, 2012-15 and 2016-19, respectively). The third period is currently being 
prepared. In purpose, vertical collaboration would be reorganised around new common 
tasks, leaving less power at the federal level and providing more power for the cantons 
(Cappelletti and al., 2014). The new balance thus would work as a partnership model.  
The article’s main purpose is to provide a first qualitative analysis on the impact of these 
CPs on the vertical cooperation. It provides a brief explanation on the reasons that 
prompted the government to reform the system and will introduce these conventions-
programs. It then addresses to what extent the CPs meet the objectives of the reform, 
and describes the study methodology to include data from different sources, e.g., 
interviews with heads of cantonal offices2, official documents of the Confederation, and 
peer-reviewed articles.  
The article is structured as follows.  
                                               
1 Art. 3 of the 1999 Constitution. The principle of subsidiarity aims at determining the level of intervention 
that is most relevant in the areas of competences shared between the Central State and the Member 
States. 
2 Department of the Nature and landscape of the canton of Geneva, Department of the Economic 
Promotion of the Canton of Vaud, Head of internal service Conference of Cantonal governments and 
responsible nature and landscape of the Federal office for the Environment, Department of Cultural 
Heritage and Historic Preservation of canton of Valais and Department of Noise and Sound Insulation of 
cantons of Vaud, Geneva and Valais. 
Mathys, Swiss Reform of Allocation of Tasks 27 
 
First, the problems are raised by being given historic and actual contexts of the division 
of competences between the Confederation and the cantons. Second, a theoretical 
framework is developed for the principles of the reform that allows a better 
understanding of the general effects of the reform and the specific effects of the CPs on 
the institutional cooperation. Important theories are defined, such as Public choice, 
transaction costs, and Principal-agent theories. The CPs’ contents, procedures and 
applicability in the field are described. Third, a methodological section explains the 
theoretical dimensions used for the assessment of the CPs and the choice of the 25 
cases studies, followed by a section containing the research questions and the 
hypotheses. Fourth, the results are discussed and analysed. Then the CPs are 
evaluated, and the hypotheses are tested. Finally, different fundamental arguments are 
discussed to explain why the system of the CPs is not optimal today and needs a 
complete rethinking. Concluding remarks and a discussion of the results of the 
allocation of tasks are presented. 
2. Context and Problems 
To understand national and regional relations in Switzerland, it is helpful not only to look 
at the structure and the organization, but also to have a brief look back at history. 
Switzerland’s existence as a modern federal state dates back to 1848, when the cantons 
and their citizens accepted the new Federal Constitution, which guarantees status, 
autonomy and a degree of sovereignty to each institutional entity (Frey and al., 2005). 
The national state has been unified thanks to a federalist system and a strong 
decentralization. The Swiss Federal model separates state power in three institutional 
levels (“power-sharing”): federal, cantonal and communal. Switzerland can best be 
described as a “bottom-up” type of cooperative federalism that leaves considerable 
policy, scope, and fiscal competences to the symmetric federal units (Ladner, 2015). 
Because the cantons could not handle all public duties, they gradually consented to give 
up some of their rights. Nevertheless, the competences of the federal authorities 
remained rather limited, and the residual powers remaining in the hands of the cantons3 
were preventing the political system from being too centralized (Ladner et al., 2013). 
However, the apparent institutional stability of Swiss federalism since 1848 has long 
masked a hidden centralization of power both at the national (at the expense of the 
cantons) and cantonal level (at the expense of communes), in what Braun (2009) names 
the “creeping centralization” process that began after the Second World War. The reform 
of the allocation of tasks entailed a complete overhaul of re-assignment of competences 
and fiscal equalization between Confederation and cantons (vertical dimension), as well 
as among the cantons themselves (horizontal dimension) (Vatter and Wälti, 2003). 
                                               
3 Residual competences: capacity of the municipality or the cantons to take care of a public activity, which 
is not claimed by higher authorities and not attributed by the Constitution.  
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Over time, the number of public tasks increased significantly and led to interwoven 
policy structures that became difficult to manage, as they resulted in an entanglement of 
responsibilities and competences (Politikverflechtung). As implementation of public 
policies was non-transparent and non-institutionalized, this led to irresponsible 
expenditure behavior and problems of spillovers (Braun, 2009 and Fleiner, 2002). 
Because the federal government had gained more and more powers - co-determination 
rights in many tasks areas, which were originally attributed to the cantons – in the early 
1970’s, it began to increase its debt while the cantons stabilized theirs, even though it 
remained high4. The Confederation progressively transferred its financial resources to 
the cantons responsible for the implementation of tasks. The 1980s marked the 
beginning of an economic crisis, which ultimately led the federal authorities to take 
austerity measures5 and transfer its financial obligations to the cantons (Frey and al., 
2005). The cantons have become overwhelmed by the implementation and execution of 
tasks, and hence unable to finance and perform their own tasks. “It was increasingly 
argued that, when regulation, financing and implementation of a policy do not coincide, 
the system becomes sub-optimal” (Ladner, 2015). In the early 1970s, the media started 
describing the difficulties, the delays or even the non-execution of tasks by the cantons 
as a “crisis of implementation” (Vollzugskrise). The concept of executive federalism was 
strongly condemned and began to take on a negative connotation (Wälti, 2001). In this 
way, federalism seemed to create inter-dependencies and contradictions between 
actors: the Confederation required that the cantons execute the public programs, and 
the cantons in turn wanted to regain their autonomy and participation in the decision-
making process. This system created an interpenetration of the three institutional levels 
underlined by a tangle of responsibilities, a challenge for which federalism was not 
prepared (Dafflon, 2004). The NFA reform began in 1991, with the initial analyses on the 
effectiveness of fiscal equalization and division of competences within a federal state 
prepared by the Swiss Finance Administration (Wettstein, 2002).  
In summary, the reasons that led to the reform were as various as they were numerous 
(Jacot-Descombes, 2013): 
 The increase of public tasks (between 1940 and 1970), 
 The increase of the citizens’ exigencies in the quality of the public service, 
 The multiplication of powers ceded by the cantons to the Confederation 
(centralization process), 
 The financial and administrative pressures imposed on the cantons by the 
Confederation, 
 The loss of autonomy and decision-making competences of the cantons,  
 The “Crisis of implementation” and the tangle of responsibilities,  
                                               
4 Federal Council. 1981. Popular turnout on the financial Regime. Bern. 709-710 
5 Federal Council. 1980. Saving program. Bern 
Mathys, Swiss Reform of Allocation of Tasks 29 
 
 The disintegration of the principles of federalism (transparency, subsidiarity, and 
fiscal equivalence). 
The aim of the reform is to create a spirit of partnership through a vertical collaboration 
in which strategic management is the charge of the Confederation, and operational 
responsibility is assigned to the cantons. These CPs are legally based on art. 46 al. 2 of 
the Constitution of 1999: "The Confederation and the cantons may agree that the 
cantons perform the implementation of federal law; to this end, they set up programs 
financially supported by the Confederation". According to article 23 of LSu, the subsidies 
provided by the CPs are not measured by the progress of the work (input), but are 
based on results (output) (Wettstein, 2001). This procedure, regarded as a new form of 
organization, signifies a radical change from both an administrative and a conceptual 
point of view. It reinforces the multilevel government structure. Time alone will tell 
whether this way of meeting the challenges of multilevel governance (Benz, 2004) will 
prove to be successful (Ladner, 2010). 
Currently, the second period of the CPs (2012-2015) is approaching its end, and it is 
appropriate to assess the effectiveness of the reform to date. This involves taking into 
account the meetings with cantonal authorities and the various evaluation reports from 
the Federal Finance Administration (March 2014), the Audit Office (May 2014), and the 
Foundation for Confederation Collaboration (June 2014). Although it would be 
premature to make definitive conclusions, it may be useful to study the advances made 
in disentangling responsibilities and tasks, and decreasing the expenses of the cantons.  
3. The Conceptual Framework and Overview of the Literature 
The political elites believed that the allocation of tasks was the solution to change 
significantly the relationship between the Confederation and the cantons. Drawing on 
the federal reports and the literature, it is apparent that many principles of the New 
Public Management (NPM) have had a strong influence on this Swiss reform by 
providing its ultimate direction and shaping its values. Braun exemplifies this influence in 
showing that the “framework program”, written and published by the Conference of 
Cantonal Finance Ministers (Konferenz der Finanzdirektoren; CFM) in 1991, was replete 
with NPM thinking: clear objectives, purposeful steering, and transparency of procedure. 
According to Braun, it even became impossible to reform the organization of the state 
without legitimizing it by a reference to the notion of efficiency or use of basic ideas from 
NPM philosophy. The conceptual background is thus centered on the NPM principles.  
The establishment of the theoretical framework based its roots on the work of 
Christophe Hood in 1991.  He drew attention to the origin of the NPM design, which is a 
marriage of two different ideologies. On one hand, one movement was the “new 
institutional economics” that was built on the post-World War II era: the development of 
Public choice theory, transactions costs theory, and Principal-agent theory. The new 
institutional economics movement abetted the creation of a set of administrative reform 
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doctrines built on ideas of competition, user choice, and incentive structures such as 
contracts and transparency. On the other hand, the second partner of this marriage was 
the business-type “Managerialism” phenomenon that results in successive waves of 
reform based on the ideas of professional management expertise with better 
performance and higher outputs (Pollitt, 1990 and Rhodes, 1997). The resulting three 
theories help to frame the main problems addressed in this article. To bring a new 
approach to the reform assessment, multi-level governance is also considered. In order 
to assess the CPs, the yardsticks of the NFA principles are applied. These are assumed 
to be the same as the NPM principles, which are considered as comparative references. 
New institutional economics and multi-level governance theories are defined in order to 
construct a set of assumptions and identify several important questions. 
In the 1980s, NPM reform introduced methods and management tools directly from 
private and multinational companies (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004). The objectives were 
greater efficiency, productivity and quality of services, better use of public resources, 
and a reduction of hierarchy (Giauque & Emery, 2008). In Switzerland, the NPM has 
been a source of inspiration and had great influence in the 1990s (Emery, 2000). 
Reforms of public administration have focused mainly on increasing organizational 
efficiency and reducing costs. Accordingly, the Confederation has tried to transfer the 
NPM principles to vertical collaboration, whereas they were initially implemented in 
horizontal cooperation (among regions, cantons, or private and public players).  
The Swiss government had precisely the ambition to create a partnership to promote a 
cooperation based on non-hierarchical relationships, in order to give a strategic role to 
the Confederation and operational responsibility to the cantons. This would provide 
more accountability and flexibility to the cantons, improve the performance of the public 
management, and strengthen exchanges between the federal and cantonal levels 
through a long negotiation process. The use of global budgets originating from the 
Confederation and distributed to the cantons would allow them to have operational 
freedom to fulfill the tasks agreed upon. Beyond these principles, the NPM also 
promoted the use of public contracts in public administration (Athias, 2013).  
In this way, a more determined, professional, open and flexible public administration 
becomes a real machine, delivering more transparent policy and empowering managers 
to provide service delivery. Delivery contracts, agency contracts, convention objectives, 
and contracts of public markets all belong to “internal contracting”, such as the CPs 
(Chevallier, 2008); also known as “performance contracting”, as opposed to “external 
contracting”, according to Greve (2005). A first assumption can be formulated by 
considering the CPs as respectful of these principles. It raises some fundamental 
questions, such as whether the vertical cooperation is truly non-hierarchical, and 
whether the CPs really assign a strategic role to the Confederation and an operational 
role to the cantons that is reinforced by better communication?  
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Contracting for public services is thus an integral part of the NPM movement that 
influenced public sector reform in most OECD countries (Greve, 2005 and Hood 1991). 
One of the chief aims of contracting is to influence performance and achieve a better 
output. In fact, results-based management is still being seriously discussed at all levels 
of the political sector (Power, 2000). Proponents of NPM attribute a high priority to 
measuring outputs and outcomes, and aim to base their new policies and management 
activities on these data. This is ideally meant to make policy implementation more 
efficient (cost-effective action, measured by the costs/benefits report) and effective 
(achievement of the objectives) (Von Thiel, 2002). For this reason, performance has to 
be seen as the key feature of the NPM, as well as the main goal of the 2004 Swiss 
reform. The article 43 al. 5 of the 1999 Constitution stipulates by insinuation that the 
CPs have to be adequately rational. In accordance to the rational choice theory, the 
choices of an agent are aimed at optimizing profitability and productivity, which are 
directly related to performance (Scott, 2000). A second assumption can be expressed 
here by determining whether the CPs are performing well in the implementation of public 
policies. 
According to the specialist Simon Domberger (1998), the benefits of contracting are 
specialization, market discipline, flexibility, and cost savings. These positive effects of 
public contracts are also emphasized by the Public choice theory. In accordance with 
this theory, policy makers may tend to pursue political rather than economic objectives, 
which can undermine the effectiveness of the service (Buchanan and Tollison, 1984). 
Governments and administrations often have incentives (election, income, power) that 
drive them to produce inefficient outcomes (Rawls, 1971). On one hand, the contract 
specifies the objectives and development of public service and can avoid such 
excesses. On the other hand, it is necessary to fully specify means and costs of public 
services in order to maintain a good quality of service.  
The problem can be more deeply explained by using the terminology of the Principal-
agent theory, or agency dilemma. One set of arguments finds its roots in the work of 
Waterman and Meier (1998), and is based on the development of political relations 
between a principal (Confederation) and an agent (cantons). Both are usually assumed 
to be motivated by self-interest. But the problem is that self-interest often makes the 
agent reluctant to share the information with the principal (Bergen and al. 1992). Thus 
the principal works under the conditions of incomplete information; the agent has 
information that the principal would like to obtain. Whenever an individual (the principal) 
trusts another person (the agent) to perform a service on his behalf and cannot fully 
observe the agent’s actions, a principal-agent problem arises. The problem is a moral 
hazard and involves adverse selection, also called “hidden action” and “hidden 
information” (Greve, 2005). To encourage an agent (cantons) to act in the interest of the 
principal (the state), a compensation system, based on a model contract, is needed 
(Jensen and al., 1976). Therefore, Confederations make a contract with the cantons 
“which perfectly controls the agent” (Laffont and Martimot, 2001).  
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In light of the conventions-programs, cantons are involved in the negotiations, and often 
know more than the Confederation about a particular public policy, which allows them to 
ask for more flexibility and freedom of action in its implementation. To maintain “control” 
and prevent cantons from acting for their own benefit, the Confederation must impose 
clear objectives in the contracts (Miller, 2005). "Everything is a matter of incentive: 
incentive to work hard, incentive to produce good quality products (...); how to design 
institutions in order to provide incentives for good economic agents is a central issue of 
economics today” (Williamson, 1975). In addition, the federal government should 
introduce a monitoring system and a benefit contract, as well as appropriate incentives, 
such as bonuses or penalties to reduce the risks; even if it creates "transaction costs" 
(Williamson, 1975). 
In summary, agency theory uses the metaphor of a contract to describe relationships in 
which one party delegates to another (Jensen and al., 1976). The focus of the theory is 
on determining the most efficient contract, given the environmental uncertainty and the 
costs of obtaining information for the principal to monitor the agent completely. 
Surprisingly, most agency models define efficiency from the principal’s point of view, 
where the principal is not always the dominant party in the relationship (Bacharach and 
Lawler, 1981). Indeed, Greve assumes that contracting represents a break with the 
hierarchical mode of governance. In the context of CPs, an efficient contract is not the 
one that brings about the best possible outcome for the principal given the constraints 
imposed; but rather that which maximizes the joint utility of both principal and agent. A 
third assumption can be articulated by considering the CPs as an instrument creating an 
equal negotiation between the Confederation and the cantons.  
The Multi-level governance theory also is also relevant to this study. With the recent 
increase of cooperation and participation in politics or public administration, the multi-
level governance theory has gained importance (Bach and Flinder, 2004). It quickly 
became a catchall concept that indicated phenomena taking place on three different 
analytical levels, as stated by Piattoni in 2010: political mobilization (politics), policy-
making arrangements (policy), and state structures (polity). It also evokes the idea of 
increasingly complex arrangements and network structures for arriving at authoritative 
decisions (Piattoni, 2010). At its center, the theory prefers negotiation and cooperation 
instead of coercion, command, and control (Kersbergen and Waarden, 2004).  
Former experiences have shown that development of political programs and their 
implementation are no longer in the hands of the sovereign state alone. Although CPs 
are designed to handle common tasks between the Confederation and the cantons, their 
negotiation involves other players. In practice, cantons need to consult both public and 
private parties before and during the negotiation process. This broad consultation brings 
a new perspective to the vertical cooperation. According to Peters and Jon (1998) and 
Hooghe and Marks (2001), multi-level governance adds new elements to traditional 
state functions, such as civil society, multilevel politics, network systems, and 
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bargaining. It begins when the relationship is not hierarchical, and when it involves the 
three main institutional levels: "negotiated, non-hierarchical exchanges between 
institutions at the transnational, national, regional and local levels" (Peters and Jon, 
1998). This theory thus invites normative reflection on the conditions under which 
binding decisions gain widespread acceptance and bestow legitimacy. Hoogh and Marks 
(2001) argue that public management is more effective if it is carried out by multilevel 
relationships, which could limit federal centralization and reinforces the role of each 
player.  In accordance with the works of Benz (2010), a last hypothesis can be framed 
by assuming that this multi-level governance in the CPs’ structures allows for more 
effective and legitimate policy-making.  
4. The CPs as New Public Instruments 
The CPs are valid for three periods of four years (2008-11, 2012-15 and 2016-19, 
respectively), and the model is the same for each canton. These CPs are allocated 
between the Confederation and the cantons, which negotiate the federal contributions 
and the package of coordinated and consistent measures for a period of four years. As 
mentioned earlier, grants are theoretically no longer based on individual projects, but on 
a general budget based on objectives and indicators.  
At the beginning of the reform, only 15 main common tasks were covered by CPs, all 
gathered in nine different categories of public policies. As time passed, other public 
areas have been added through successive changes of laws and ordinances, and are 
now treated by CPs. These public programs are additional tasks, which have been 
fulfilled jointly by the Confederation and the cantons. These new public areas are: 
 the New Regional Policy (2008-2015), 
 the renovation of the buildings program (2010-2020) introduced by the Act on 
CO2, 
 the introduction of cadastre restricting public right to land (2012-2015), 
 the specific encouragement of cantonal integration of foreigners (2014-2017). 
 
They are not all based on a four year period. For instance, the first one is planned for a 
six year period, whereas the renovation of buildings program is calculated on a ten year 
period. However, these programs are sometimes broader and may include other 
territorial units, such as regions or districts (e.g., the New Regional Policy).  To conclude, 
nineteen CPs are in progress in 2015. An overall picture of the CPs in existence and 
their associated tasks is presented in Figure 1, below. The tasks in bold face are areas 
covered by the CPs. As of 2015, twenty-two common tasks, nineteen CPs and four 
public areas are applied by CPs (in grey). 
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Figure 1: Division of tasks between institutional levels.  
 
Year 7 Federal tasks 10 Cantonal tasks 26 Common tasks  
2008 
   
 
1. Pensions  
2. Invalidity insurance  
3. Support for country-
wide activities of 
organisations for the 
disabled 
4. Highways  
5. Defense 
6. Agricultural 
consultancy agencies  
7. Animal breeding 
 
 
1. Support for housing  
2. Working and day- care 
facilities for invalids 
3. Special schools 
4. Support for regional 
and local activities of 
organisations for the 
disabled 
5. Educational grants up 
to secondary school  
6. Traffic control outside 
agglomerations  
7. Support for 
educational facilities for 
social workers  
8. Recreation and sport  
9. Airfields  
10. Improvement of 
housing conditions in 
mountain areas  
 
 
1. Medicare (individual subsidies for health care 
insurance) 
2. Additional social benefits   
3. Higher education grants  
4. Traffic within agglomerations  
5. Regional traffic 
6. Main roads 
7. Noise protection along local and cantonal roads  
8. Execution of criminal penalties and measures 
9. Official measurements  
10. Protection of cultural heritage and  
conservation of historic monuments  
11. Nature and wildlife protection  
12. Flood protection 
13. Water protection  
14. Improvement of agricultural structures  
15. Forest maintenance (protection, management, 
and biodiversity)  
16. Hunting oversight 
17. Fishing oversight 
18. National parks 
19. Defensive works and basic data on dangers 
20. Protection of natural habitats of waterfowl and 
wildlife 
21. Protection of natural heritage of UNESCO 
22. Development program for mountain region 
 
 
 
   
 
2008 
 
23. Encouragement of the development of 
regional policy - economic development (New 
Regional Policy (NPR)) 
2010 
24. Remediation Program for buildings - partial 
revision of the CO2 Act (2010-2020) 
2012 
25. Introducing a cadastral real estate register to 
restrict public right to land (2012-2015) 
2014 
26. Specific encouragement of the integration of  
foreigners - (Revision of the cantonal integration 
programs (PIC)) 
Extension 
of the CPs 
to other 
areas  
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As the idea behind the creation of the CPs was to use them as a blueprint for other 
tasks, they can easily be applied to other common tasks. The eight common tasks that 
are not covered by the CPs are those whose principal responsibility resides clearly with 
the cantons. In these cases, the initiative for the realisation of cantonal benefits belongs 
to private owners, or to those involved in the purely financial provision of services, as 
opposed to institutions or individuals (whose contributions are considered non-
negotiable because they have already been settled through federal law; Federal 
Finance Administration, 2014). Each CP is written in sixteen points6. Despite the 
Confederation’s willingness to standardize these contracts, norms vary according to the 
complexity or the particularity of the public domain. These public contract models are 
given by the Confederation to the cantons as an annual report that comprises the 
following: 
The preamble sets out the framework of the CP. It presents all the objectives, which 
have to be achieved at the end of the four year period. The objectives are specified in 
detail with different indicators. Depending on their complexity, they can be included in 
the appendices of the CP. These indicators are the criteria for the final control by the 
Confederation, which verifies that the objectives have been fulfilled. "In all cases, 
indicators should be defined as much as possible to not be influenced by unpredictable 
factors such as natural events, especially the weather."  
The legal bases establish the identity of the institutional players, as well as the scope 
and duration of the convention. The canton must achieve the objectives "at the lowest 
cost, within the time limits and goals, and organize themselves adequately”. The 
amounts paid by the federal government may be divided among the different objectives 
of the program. These amounts are paid each year in June or July, according to the 
Convention-program schedule. Payments are made independently of the achievement 
of objectives, unless significant problems arise, in which case benefits may be reduced 
or suspended. 
If one or more objectives are not fulfilled before the end of the period, the canton can 
ask for a delay of an additional year to achieve them. For that extra time, the 
Confederation does not make any additional contribution. However, "the obligation to 
achieve the objectives within an additional period does not apply if the canton can prove 
that the agreed service cannot be provided due to external circumstances beyond its 
control". If after additional time the canton is unable to meet the goals, the federal 
government may ask for a payback of federal contributions. It is also possible for the 
                                               
6 1. Preamble 2. Legal bases 3. Contracting parties 4. Contractual territory 5. Validity 6. Objects of the 
contracts 7. Bases for financing 8. Method of payment of the fixed contribution 9. Administration 10. 
Obligations of the parties 11. Framework conditions and terms of adaptation 12. Performance of the 
contract 13. Procedure in case of differences of opinion 14. Miscellaneous 15. Entry into effect of the 
contract 16. Appendix 
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cantons to change goals during the contract time, if conditions change and excessively 
complicate the execution of the CP. In this case, if a service cannot be provided, 
alternatives can be found.  
The responsible cantonal service is authorized to use the federal contribution to provide 
for another objective of the program. To have an effective and optimal CP, this 
adaptation mechanism must be accompanied by an escape clause: if a provision of the 
agreement loses part or all of its effectiveness due to changes in the general conditions, 
this does not affect the legal effectiveness of the entire CP. "As a private contract law, 
the intent of the provision in question must be reached as fully as possible."  
In case of differences of opinion, a special procedure can be applied to settle conflicts, 
even during the CP period. Finally, the State Councillor of the canton and the head of 
the federal department usually sign the contracts.  
The negotiation process includes the following steps: 
 The Confederation sends a letter to the cantons to initiate negotiations on CPs. 
The cantons must specify the general lines on the content and financial matters 
in a contract draft.  
 After a general review of cantonal requests by the federal board, the negotiation 
may start. During the negotiation process, each party provides interdisciplinary 
coordination between specialized federal and cantonal divisions. 
 Adjustments should then be made on the positions of each player, before the 
formal notification of the agreement to the appropriate federal agency. 
 The Confederation and the canton finalize the agreement, and when everything 
is accepted, the newsletter is officially published and the cantons transmit the 
CPs to municipalities for consultation. 
The municipalities cannot participate in the negotiations, as these may only occur 
between the Confederation and the cantons. Third parties merely have the right of final 
consultation; or, exceptionally, to be consulted by the main institutional player during 
negotiations on projects involving towns and municipalities (particularly in the field of 
environment). 
Conversely, a contact with individual municipalities is recommended when a CP refers to 
a single exceptional object on the territory of the municipality in question. In practice, it is 
very rare that municipalities wish to consult the CP. Nevertheless, it should be noted that 
the CPs involve more strategic objectives, and therefore it is a relatively rare occurrence 
that common interests are particularly affected.  
After notification or publication, the cantons, municipalities, or third parties have thirty 
days to appeal if they wish to make adjustments to the CP content. If an appeal is 
accepted, the Confederation must contact the cantons for a second proposal - if 
necessary, following further negotiations.  
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Finally, after an appeal procedure, the authorized agents – those responsible for the 
federal office and the cantonal State Councillor - sign the agreement. The CP then 
becomes a contract under public law. 
 
5. Research questions, hypotheses and methodology 
The purpose of this paper is to determine whether the CPs meet the objectives of the 
reform, and to assess the allocation of tasks and their impact on the vertical 
cooperation. This requires answers to the following research questions:  
 
 Is the vertical cooperation non-hierarchical?  
 Does it give the CPs a strategic role in the Confederation and an operational role 
in the cantons?  
 Should the vertical cooperation be reinforced by improved communication?  
 Are the CPs performing as dictated by the Constitution?  
 Is there a multi-level governance situation in the application of conventions-
programs? And if so, to what extent does it allow a better implementation of 
tasks?  
In addition four hypotheses were tested: 
 
 H1: The CPs respect and apply the NPM principles.  
 H2: The CPs are performing in the implementation of public policies. 
 H3: The CPs create an equal negotiation between the Confederation and the 
cantons.  
 H4: These multi-level governance structures allow for more effective and 
legitimate application of the CPs. 
 
The qualitative study was based on twenty-five cases studies. Five different CPs were 
selected for analysis (protection of cultural heritage and conservation of historic 
monuments; encouragement of the integration of foreigners; economic development; 
protection against noise; and protection of the nature and landscape), as were five 
cantons (Vaud, VD; Valais, VS; Geneva. GE; Zurich, ZH; Uri, UR). Each CP was 
carefully chosen based on the fact that each has different characteristics, such as 
financial deficits, institutional communication weaknesses, or delay issues. The diversity 
of the sample allows for a complete picture of the CPs’ applications. Likewise, the 
cantons were chosen according to their economic, cultural, size and demographic 
Mathys, Swiss Reform of Allocation of Tasks 38 
 
density differences (chosen in accordance with the data provided by the Swiss office of 
statistics (Bundesamt für Statistik; BFS).   
First, a questionnaire of twenty-seven opened or closed questions in French or German 
was submitted to the cantonal representatives in charge of the selected CPs. This 
questionnaire was based on the principles of the NPM. These NPM principles are the 
following: Vertical partnership, Non-hierarchical collaboration, Attribution of strategic/ 
operational roles, Global grants, and Performance. 
It is very difficult to define the performance, as it is not possible to impose objective 
indicators about what constitutes “good performance.” Consequently, the outcome was 
defined as the “perception of the performance” that can be measured by two variables: 
the efficacy and the efficiency.  
The analysis was based on variables directly interpreted from the NPM principles 
previously listed. The variables that were used for the research include: 
 the intensity of the communication between the institutional levels before and 
during the negotiation process, 
 the type of role given to each player, 
 the degree of coordination with other players (multi-level governance),  
 cantonal satisfaction, 
 the type of federal grants agreed upon (based on inputs or outputs),  
 the profiles of the cantons (economic weight, demographic density, and 
geographic size of the cantons to distinguish whether they have any influence on 
the contractual agreements). 
The questionnaire answers were coded from one (positive) to five (negative or “I don’t 
know”), and transcribed into the IBM SPSS Statistics 22.0 software to analyse which 
questions were relevant for the research, relying on frequency tables and initial 
observations.  
This paper develops only the three first steps. It presents intermediate results from 
twelve interviews given in cantonal offices from June 2014 to March 2015. Every public 
domain and every canton selected were included in this first sample. The questionnaire 
seems to be both relevant and precise. Only two questions were slightly modified 
following remarks of two cantonal authorities.   
The future steps will be the completion of all these interviews, and addition of data from 
the national level provided by interviews with federal authorities. This will allow analysis 
from both sides of the negotiation: the Confederation and the cantons. Then, the results 
will be analysed on the fs/QCA software to find which conditions are necessary or 
sufficient to have performing CPs. This Qualitative Comparative Analysis Method (QCA) 
is commonly used to generalize results in a macro perspective by making a comparison 
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with a few qualitative cases. It integrates key strengths of both qualitative (case-
oriented) and quantitative (variable-oriented) approaches that will bring a strong plus-
value to this research. 
6. Findings 
Interview Results  
 
Twelve interviews have already been conducted with cantonal authorities. Some CPs 
seem to be more effective than others. One main observation can be made: if the public 
task is originally well-defined and can easily be divided into clear objectives, then it is 
easier to set indicators. However, this seems to be an ideal situation, because the main 
problem remains: the definition of indicators and the respect of the objectives agreed 
upon at the beginning of the negotiation. The CPs need time in order to be well-
accomplished.  
For instance, the CP for the official measurements was the first one to be launched in 
2008. At the beginning it even was a pilot-project. After a few adjustments, it is now 
perfectly applied. On the contrary, the CP for the protection of Cultural Heritage and 
Historic Preservation was applied later; at the beginning, the subsidies system was 
still based on specific costs (input) instead of general grants (output). It is believed by 
Mr. Benoît Coppey, Deputy of Heritage in the monuments and archaeology service of 
Valais, that this CP should remain as it is. The reason is that in contrast to the other 
public domains, four year planning is impossible. His service operates on the requests 
of punctual intervention from municipalities, private parties, or churches. As a 
consequence, he cannot know what annual financial amount is required for any given 
year. The Federal Culture Office (Bundesamt für Kultur; BAK) already expects his 
service to determine the budget for the 2016-2019 period in April 2015, but it is not 
possible to project how many projects will be undertaken. Moreover, the passage from 
one CP to another is poorly organized because the grants completely stop during the 
transition; as written by Mr. Coppey in the annual report, “the latest execution for the 
2012-2015 period must be made by April 2015. This will result in a period of uncertainty 
until the approval of the following convention-program (first half of 2016), during which it 
will be impossible to confirm federal funding for projects submitted during this period.” 
Another problem raised is the inadequate budget provision. A 2014 federal report 
announced that the total amount needed to perform all the tasks should be in excess of 
100 million francs. Today, the amount reaches only 34 million. Valais requested 3.9 
million, but according to Mr. Coppey, it will receive only 2.8 million. In summary, such 
evidence confirms that the CP for the protection of Cultural Heritage and Historic 
Preservation has encountered major temporal and financial problems.  
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To give another example, the CP for the protection of Nature and Landscape was 
applied in 2008 with unclear and objectives which were too broad, such as for “natural 
environment” or “species,” according to Mr. Bertrand Von Arx, Director of biodiversity in 
Geneva. Moreover, there is a lack of communication between some cantons and the 
Confederation: as stated by Mr. Von Arx, the Federal Office for the Environment 
(Bundesamt für Umwelt; BAFU) should include the cantons earlier in the decision-
making process. For example, the Confederation has made an important working 
document about federal priorities in the environment. Mr. Von Arx deplores the fact that 
the content was decided only by the federal experts, when in fact, it is required that the 
cantons participate. In addition, the Handbook of the BAFU (2014) drew attention to the 
diversification and the heterogeneity of the protection measures, the landscape 
development in the environmental arena, and the impossibility of comparing the two. In 
making decisions alone, the Confederation could lack some important cantonal 
information, resulting in negative interactions with the cantons. Another problem raised 
by the canton is the measure of the indicators or objectives. Indeed, in the 
environmental area, the results of an action cannot be collected after four years; rather, 
a much longer period is required (Federal Audit Service, 2013). In those circumstances, 
the annual evaluation made by the Confederation is useless. Finally, Mr. Von Arx 
maintains that the Confederation should give more flexibility to the cantons; for instance, 
allowing them to work together on larger cantonal projects.  
Likewise, Mrs. Véronique Martrou, Economist at the Department of Economic 
Development and Trade of Vaud and in charge of the convention-program for the 
Encouragement of the development of regional policy, argues that the Secretariat 
for Economic Affairs of the Confederation (Staatssekretariat für Wirtschaft; SECO) 
should  participate more in the discussion before the negotiation process. As stated by 
Mrs. Martrou, the strategic orientation that should normally be given by the 
Confederation is not clear enough. In that regard, she regrets not having formal 
sessions with the Confederation to share more; she truly considers that it is a matter of 
coordination.  
Another problematic situation concerns the convention-program for the issues of 
Noise and Sound Insulation. The two cantonal representatives in charge of this public 
task agree that the role of the Confederation is not strategic enough and sometimes can 
be incompetent, e.g. with regard to the Federal Roads Office (Bundesamt für Strassen; 
ASTRA). According to the representatives, ASTRA is not as innovative as it should be. 
Mr. Cyril Durussel, Engineer at the Directorate General for Mobility and roads in Vaud, 
says that ASTRA is still studying solutions that have existed for the past twenty years. 
The Noise Protection ordinance was written in 1987 and revised in 2004. It set an end to 
the federal subsidies in 2015 for highways and railways, and in 2018 for other roads, 
such as cantonal and municipal roads. Political players already know that many of the 
objectives will be reached. As a result, many compensation claims from individuals will 
be formulated because of noise from heavy transport. According to the Federal Office of 
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the Environment, victims will demand 19 billion Swiss francs as compensation. 
Obviously, such a prospect seriously concerns federal officials. The Federal office of the 
Environment would like to abolish the current system and base the standard noise 
compensation on more predictable annual amounts, which could avoid disbursement of 
the large and variable amounts determined by the courts (the so-called law project 
“LAN”). But according to Mr. Lucien Pignat, Engineer at the Department of 
Transportation, Equipment and Environment of Valais, the cantons already oppose this 
scenario, fearing high costs. According to Mr. Christian Gorce, Director of the 
Department of the Environment, Transports and Agriculture of Geneva, another issue is 
that the negotiation is not as equal as desired; rather, it is very hierarchical. More than 
imposing the contract on the cantons, the Confederation has the final word on the 
subsidies distributed to the cantons. Thus, the bargaining process is far from equal, 
which illustrates the largest contradiction with the NPM principles. In the questionnaire 
responses, Mr. Gorce and Mr. Pignat expressed their dissatisfaction with the weak 
federal subsides received and the impossibility to request an increase. They question 
whether the CPs are truly innovative, or whether they already revealed their limitations.  
 
Questionnaire Results 
 
Interviews of respondents revealed many interesting points. The answers to the 
questionnaires were entered into the IBM software, from which measurements were 
made and calculations were performed upon the data.  
The first observation made is on the contacts that cantons have, both before and during 
the negotiation process of the CPs (Figure 2). By counting the number of positive 
answers of the questionnaires, it was possible to create bar plots. Each percentage was 
calculated as follows: total of number of “very strong” + total of number of “strong” / total 
of answers (12) x 100.  
Before the negotiation, the cantons apparently don’t have any contact with the media 
(0%) and very few with private companies (12%). Sometimes they consult the 
municipalities (28%), as some of them could have special requests or interests. For 
instance, the protection against noise often involves the municipalities. The canton of 
Vaud consulted almost 160 municipalities before the negotiation, in order to estimate the 
needs and expectations of these participative municipalities. Regarding the most 
frequent contacts, these concern the Confederation and the other cantons. The only CP 
that involved the associations before the negotiation is one concerning the protection of 
the Nature and Landscape. For instance, expertise from “Pro Natura,”7 or the Swiss 
                                               
7 Pro Natura is a private non-profit organization founded in 1909; it is the largest organization for 
nature conservation in Switzerland. 
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association for the protection against birds (“BirdLife”), were requested by the Nature 
and Landscape Office in Geneva. The same is also true among the Universities, 
especially the Graduate School of Landscape, Engineering and Architecture of Geneva 
(HEPIA). Indeed, expertise from environmental associations or universities are often 
sought by some of the cantons for the preparation of the CP.   
In contrast, during the negotiation, municipalities are consulted less (12%), which is also 
true for the other cantons (21%). After the “multilevel groundwork” is achieved, the 
cantons then have to debate with the Confederation alone. Indeed, the graph shows that 
the main contact that cantons have is with the Confederation (58%). This step only 
concerns both of the contractors. It moves towards an atmosphere of competitive 
behaviors between each canton. “Who is receiving more from the Confederation, and 
why?” are recurrent preoccupations among the cantons. Despite of the fact that the CPs 
are free access – although not necessarily published online – they were not easy to 
obtain, nor was it simple to ask the cantonal authorities for the financial amounts they 
received from the Confederation.  
 
Figure 2: Contacts before and during the negotiation process. Percentages of 
positive answers.  
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The second observation was made pertaining to the degree of satisfaction that the 
cantonal representatives have with the CPs (Figure 3). The question was “What is your 
degree of satisfaction with the following aspects of the CPs?” The question contained 
the following elements: 
 duration of the contract,  
 structure (in sixteen dispositions),  
 frequency of the federal meetings,  
 indicators,  
 objectives,  
 delays,  
 federal control,  
 surveys,  
 annual reports,  
 type of federal finance,  
 federal finance subsidies and financial planning,  
 facility of the procedure.  
The possible answers ranged from “very inadapted” to “very adapted” and “I don’t 
know”. To determine which elements of the CPs still need to be improved, the negative 
answers were counted from “very inadapted” to “inadapted”. Among the sixteen items, 
only seven were relevant. At first glance, the fixation of indicators and objectives causes 
important problems for the majority of the cantonal authorities interviewed. The four year 
period is also problematic. For five cantonal services of twelve, four years is insufficient 
time to accomplish all the objectives initially agreed upon. This is especially the case for 
the protection of Cultural Heritage and Historic Preservation convention. Likewise, five 
cantonal players think that the federal control is not well-adapted. They are missing 
financial and personnel resources, which leads them to neglect their own areas of 
responsibility. Indeed, Mr. Von Arx from Geneva drew attention to the report of the 2013 
Federal Finance Control, which emphasizes the uselessness of these controls. The 
reason is that the results sometimes cannot be measured at the end of the period, such 
as the environmental tasks. For instance, “if the authorities decide to plant a tree, the 
result will not be evident in 4 years. It will take time for this tree to grow,” comments Mr. 
Von Arx.  
Figure 3 also shows that the federal subsidies are not adapted for many cantons. The 
interviews indicated that this was the most problematic element of the CPs, as the 
canton cannot decide the amount received. It depends heavily on the other cantons, and 
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often inadequate funds are granted. The problem is significant in the Cultural Heritage 
and Historic Preservation convention domain (Figures 4 and 5). However, the frequency 
of the meetings organized by the Confederation does not seem to be problematic, nor 
do the annual reports. Even if the cantonal agents in the Noise protection domain 
disagree, the system of calculation imposed by the Confederation is “a big and complex 
Excel graph to complete with irrelevant statistics”.   
 
Figure 3: Degree of satisfaction of the cantonal authorities interviewed. 
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Figures 4 and 5 show strong disparities between cantons and public areas. A first 
reflection can be made on the general increase of the federal subsidies from the first to 
the second period.  The cantons realized from experience exactly how much they need 
and where best to concentrate their expenses. As a result, they could re-direct their 
demands and priorities. However, there are some exceptions; such as the Noise 
protection CP, whose period spans from 2008 to 2018. Instead of changing the CP, the 
cantons modified the conditions and objectives, in addition to the financial amounts 
agreed upon in the first place. Differences of federal subsidies are quite relevant for the 
Noise protection CP, and to lesser extent, the Conservation of historic monuments, even 
if they remain low.  
Initially, the economic weight of the canton seems to depend upon the financial amounts 
received by the Confederation. For instance, there is a trend for Zurich and Geneva, the 
richest cantons of the sample (see the cantons profile in Annex 1): they are receiving 
more than the other cantons. This is especially evident in regard to Zurich. On the 
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contrary, the subsidies received by the canton of Valais are low, and are even lower for 
the canton of Uri, which is considered as the weakest canton in terms of economic 
weight. When it comes to the analysis of public areas, the subsidies given for the 
Conservation of historic monuments are very low. The subsidies for the protection of the 
Nature and Landscapes do not vary appreciably, in contrast to those in the Regional 
Policy domain.  
 
Figure 4: Federal subsidies for the 2008-11 period (Million). 
 
Figure 5: Federal subsidies for the 2012-15 period (Million). 
Source: federal subsidies agreed upon and listed in the CPs collected from March 2014 to March 2015. 
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Two variables used in the questionnaire allowed the CPs’ degree of performance to be 
assessed, i.e., efficiency and the efficacy (Figure 6). The first question related to the 
measure of efficiency was “How do you rate the costs/benefits of the conventions-
programs?” Possible answers ranged from “Very low”, “Acceptable” to “Very high”. Most 
major cantonal representatives chose “Low to very low” (53%) or “Acceptable” (45%), 
while only a small minority (2%) chose “high to very high”. For more than half the 
respondents interviewed, there are no changes compared to the situation before the 
introduction of the CPs. The second question was “Does the convention-program allow 
to save on implementation, administrative, expertise and evaluation costs?” (Figure 7). 
The question related to efficacy was the following: “Did you reach the 2008-11 
objectives?” Most of the cantonal representatives answered “No” (65%); the remainder 
answered “Yes” (25%) or “I don’t know” (10%).  
 
 Figure 6: Measure of Efficiency and Efficacy of the conventions-programs 
 
 
 
Figure 7 illustrates that the CPs can only save on implementation costs.  When it comes 
to administrative, expertise and evaluation costs, there are no differences than before 
the application of the CPs. Over half of the cantonal authorities interviewed think that 
CPs allow a better financial and political organization, even if the costs remain high for 
some charges. They are convinced that these contracts introduced clearer regulations 
and facilitated the implementation of public policies by giving more time and powers to 
the cantons.  
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Before the negotiation, the cantons have enough time to plan a better implementation 
action by contacting other players, including other cantons and to a lesser extent, 
associations and private players. Subsequently, they can be fully ready to bargain with 
the Confederation. However, the majority of the people interviewed think that they are 
not able to save costs on administrative tasks, expertise and evaluations. On the 
contrary, the introduction of CPs creates more administrative tasks by requiring 
preparation of the annual reports, gathering of the results, generation of subsequent 
reports, coordination of meetings between other cantons, and punctual compliance with 
federal controls.  
Likewise, the evaluation costs increased because the cantons must present outcomes, 
effects and consequences in a timely manner. The assumption is that this is a direct 
result of the growing importance of performance assessment in the public sector.  
 
Figure 7: overview on the conventions-programs’ costs savings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mathys, Swiss Reform of Allocation of Tasks 48 
 
Actual and future challenges 
 
Experience and practice have indicated that the use of CPs involves a learning process, 
a “step by step” procedure8. So far, the administrative units that have regularly and 
gradually implemented such contracts seem more successful than the offices that wish 
to impose them quickly, as demonstrated by the success of official public 
measurements9. The introduction of the CPs involves a strong organization for each 
step of the process. Results-based management demands a new cultural vision and 
unprecedented types of relationships between the players involved. Although the first 
period (2008-11) has shown fruitful changes, improvements are still needed. The BAFU 
has presented a first assessment of the CPs in environmental domains during the first 
period (2008-11). The results of the questionnaire generally confirm what the 
Confederation has assessed for this first period. However, the results raise new issues, 
such as the cantonal perception of the federal controls, the federal subsidies, the costs 
savings, or the degree of contact (or communication) before and during the negotiations.  
Using the results announced by the cantons, the BAFU made a comparison of each 
program and each performance indicator, with the targets set in the conventions. The 
results were derived from its annual control (“controlling”). The assessment indicators 
were the “realization rate,” from “very low” to “very high” (Figure 8). The first column 
represents the CP on the Nature and Landscape protection, and the third column 
illustrates the CP on Noise protection. The first column shows that eighty-five of the 
indicators reached 28% of the objectives, while the third column indicates that nineteen 
indicators reached 55% of the objectives. The last column combines all the CPs in the 
environmental area. Five hundred and fifty-eight of the indicators didn’t reach 60% of the 
objectives initially agreed upon. This evaluation has found some evidence to support the 
idea that the CPs need strong improvements to the indicators. According to Daniel 
Lehman, in charge of annual controlling, this problem arises from the complexity of the 
procedures and the impermissibility of the natural processes. The control’s forms were 
modified and simplified in 201310. 
 
 
 
                                               
8 Federal Finance Administration (March 2014), the Audit Office (May 2014), and the Foundation for 
Confederation Collaboration (June 2014). 
9  Federal Financial Control. 2014. Programm Vereinbarungen-Risiken und Herausforderungen Synthese 
Bericht; Bern. 
10 See the Newsletter of the Federal Office for the Environment, January 2013. 
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Figure 8: Evaluation of all the CPs in the environmental areas. 
 
 
Source: Newsletter of the Federal Office for the Environment (October 2012).  
 
In addition to the federal evaluation on the environmental area, some other general 
problems were observed during the first period and half of the second period. These 
were summarized by the cantons in 201411, and also identified in this study.  
Of special interest is the excessive influence of the Confederation in the definition of 
contract objectives, which reduces the flexibility of cantons. Challenges also arise in 
respect to the unconditional transfers defined by the CPs. According to the inputs 
(specific costs or inputs), too many contributions are still paid by the Confederation, 
which was also the procedure in the old system. During the first period, the BAK gave 
financial contributions to the cantons based on the degree of implementation progress, 
which was also the procedure before the reform. This issue can be seen in the CP for 
the protection of Cultural Heritage and Conservation of Historic monuments.  
Another difficulty that emerges is the fixation of precise indicators of reference, which 
makes the controlling process more complex. This problem has also been previously 
identified within the questionnaires. "Sometimes results of a project are achieved at the 
end of the period", which explains the absence of reliable and measurable indicators. As 
                                               
11 CdC. 2014. Monitoring on Federalism. 
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a consequence, federal control becomes complicated and periodic achievements cannot 
be calculated. However, this allows the cantons operational flexibility, which corresponds 
to the main objective of the reform. According to several federal agencies, the margin of 
independent cantonal operation is measured in connection with the definition of 
contractual objectives12.  
The lack of communication between the Confederation and the cantons is another issue 
to be addressed. Apparently, the Confederation cannot follow every cantonal project, 
which prevents it from having a strong strategic structure. For instance, according to 
Mrs. Martrou (in charge of the New Regional Policy in Vaud), because the Confederation 
doesn’t participate in the former discussions about the program, there is a lack of 
communication, as well as a lack of coordination.  
Although it is premature to draw sweeping general conclusions, considering all the 
evidence, it is clear that the CPs still need to be improved. These divergences ultimately 
make the system of allocation of tasks more complex and confused, which affects the 
principle of the CPs. Despite these negative arguments, the system is generally positive 
concerning the disentanglement of tasks, transparency, and efficiency13; it is well 
accepted by the cantons and the municipalities. Improvements can first be made in 
limiting the influence of the Confederation in the definition of objectives, in addition to 
reducing the normative density and the guidelines. More importantly, in accordance to 
the Swiss Control Finance office, it is essential that "the instrument of CPs is not a 
panacea to be applied under all circumstances."14  
 
7. Conclusion and Perspective 
The new system of the allocation of tasks requires a profound organizational change in 
philosophy and practice. The competence distribution is now designed along the lines of 
New Public management and Principal-agent theory (Braun, 2009). This model has 
been extended to the reform of the allocation of tasks to reinforce collaboration between 
the Confederation and the cantons. Based on the introduction of public law contracts, 
the players’ reform was aimed at establishing a partnership, without any form of 
hierarchy, through which both the Confederation and the cantons could participate in the 
decision-making process. This attempt was risky because the principles of the NPM 
called for horizontal cooperation, and not vertical. Because the new procedure involves 
other players, the multilevel government dimension has gained importance. The CPs are 
                                               
12 Federal Council. 2014. Report on the assessment of efficacy of the reform between the Confederation 
and the cantons; Bern. 
13 Report on the evaluation of the financial equalization between the Confederation and the cantons, 2012-
2015, from the Federal Finance Administration (FFA) 
14 “Programm Vereinbarungen-Risiken und Herausforderungen Synthese Bericht”, 2 April 2014, CFF 
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supposed to allow for a better understanding and public management between the 
Confederation and the cantons.  
This study has performed a general analysis on the impact of the CPs on vertical 
collaboration, focusing on the application of the NPM principles to assess the new 
system introduced by the reform. Despite the lack of empirical research, there is an 
astonishingly high number of reports among cantonal and federal offices about the 
application of CPs. The analysis focused on those reports and brought new empirical 
examples. Four assumptions, or hypotheses, were initially formulated to guide the 
analysis toward reaching appropriate conclusions. These hypotheses are identified in 
Section 5 above in Research Questions, Hypothesis and Methodology. 
This investigation has found some evidence to support the idea that the CPs are 
improving vertical cooperation. However, while the CPs introduced a cooperative 
federalism and are gaining quality over time, improvements are required because the 
NPM principles are not all strictly applied or respected, and many problems remain to be 
solved. 
The first general observation that has been made from the literature and the interviews 
is that vertical cooperation is not as equal and non-hierarchical as desired. Decisions 
come first from the Confederation, the party providing the funds, which corresponds to 
the principle of "the one who pays is the one who takes control". “The Confederation is 
still heading the financial and legislative controls” (Federal Financial Administration, 
2014). The distribution of federal subsidies to all cantons is made according to a limited 
budget. Consequently, the Confederation makes the final decision and ignores the 
concept of a negotiation.  
The second observation is that the assignment of decision-making and operational roles 
seems unrealistic. In light of the reform, where there are concurrent responsibilities, 
strategy is meant to be determined on the higher level, whereas operational freedom 
should be granted on the lower levels. This principle is not respected. Logically, the 
cantons cannot have an independent operational role when the Confederation is 
dictating the strategic decisions. As a result, whatever praise may be extolled in favor of 
vertical cooperation, there always has been, and still is, a hierarchical relationship.  
The third observation is that the CPs are not performing as expected. When it came to 
the question of the impact of CPs on the costs/benefits balance, the results showed 
pessimistic views, with 50% negative answers. The costs are still too high for the 
general expenses of the cantons. For the question related to efficacy, 65% of the 
cantonal representatives interviewed didn’t reach the 2008-11 objectives fixed into their 
CP. This could be a result of adjournments in the implementation, lack of financial 
amount, or insufficient time. Consequently, these public contracts are not performing yet.  
Another observation comes from the strong cooperation and participation of other 
players before or during the negotiation of the CPs. The preparation of the CPs is not in 
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the hands of the cantons and the Confederation only; it also involves associations, 
municipalities, and universities. According to the cantonal representatives interviewed, 
this broad participation could lend a strong legitimacy to the CPs. To this end, one can 
assume that the process responds to the multi-level governance theory and brings a 
new perspective to vertical cooperation. However, others could not recognize this multi-
level approach because they did not involve municipalities and outside experts.  
In addition to the short-term problems identified, more systemic problems have to be 
considered. For instance, there are still enormous differences between partners in terms 
of economic influence, which gives more influence to one partner in the decision-making 
process. The cantons including prosperous metropolitan areas with cities like Zurich or 
Geneva are much more economically powerful than those in the mountainous areas of 
the Alps, such as Valais. The major cantons and bigger cities have the ability to pay 
more (>50%) than the Confederation, which increases their political weight at the 
expense of other, weaker cantons. The condition is that each canton pays a contribution, 
which corresponds to at least the minimum of the amount provided by the 
Confederation. It is interesting to argue that sanctions should be limited as a 
consequence of unacceptable behavior. So far, there are no procedures for sanctioning 
the cantons if they do not respect the conditions of the contract. Taking into account 
cases of obstruction and outright refusal to conform from players such as the cantons, to 
follow their own logic, this could be an obstacle for the CPs. Currently, conflicts are 
solved by political means.  
Despite of the fact that CPs produce a new form of organization in the implementation of 
public policies, they could add to entanglement of tasks. Instead of disentangling 
responsibilities and tasks, it seems that this use encourages ever more common 
implementations, such as:  
 the New Regional Policy,  
 the renovation building program,  
 the introduction of cadaster restricting public right to land, 
 the encouragement of cantonal integration.  
By extending their utilization and further implication of the institutional responsibilities, 
the Confederation takes the risk of complicating the system, ultimately leading to the 
same problems encountered before the reform. 
Although the CPs still have systemic dysfunctions, the search for new energy and 
successful solutions is encouraging a mutual understanding. There has been a profound 
change in public management, which has narrowed the analysis of the Swiss federal 
system. The reform represents a “leap forward”: even if the requirements of an equal 
partnership between the different levels of government are not fully met, the reform is a 
logical attempt at change.  
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Following the various analyses - primarily from this study, but also from different federal 
offices - the following improvements are recommended for the next four year contract 
period: 
 strict implementation of the principles of the reform (payments based on output), 
 awareness of the financial and material disparities between cantons, 
 inclusion of more cantons in the initial decisions to avoid centralization pressure, 
 reduction of federal influence in setting goals,  
 reduction of guidelines and standards , 
 re-definition of the strategic role of the Confederation to include the participation 
of the cantons, 
 strengthening of vertical communication,  
 alignment of the federal and cantonal calendars.  
In summary, the reform of the allocation of tasks between the Confederation and the 
cantons has not only helped to establish a new balance of power, but has also redefined 
the federal system. Vertical cooperation now corresponds better to a cooperative 
federalism. In practice, the extension of the use of CPs to other public programs shows 
that it provides a good “blueprint” or “implementation model”, even if it is not adapted to 
all common tasks. This demonstrates the importance of this new instrument in vertical 
cooperation and the implementation of public policies.  
Despite all these positive effects, various failures have been found:  
 conflict between the strategic and the operational roles of the Confederation and 
the cantons,  
 disparate management of tasks,  
 large differences of economic influence among cantons,  
 indicators and objectives,  
 lack of financial subsidies,  
 lack of communication and coordination,  
 high administrative and evaluation costs, 
 inadequate federal controls 
 lack of limited sanctions for unacceptable behaviour.  
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The most important solutions to the above problems would be:  
 reduction of the Confederation’s influence on objectives,  
 reduction of normative density,  
 strengthening of communication,  
 better contract indicators that allow more effective federal control  
 
Further research is doubtlessly required to determine the real influence of the CPs on 
vertical cooperation. Nevertheless, this study makes it clear that over time, CPs are 
earning more acceptance and are increasing in quality. The shift from a system of 
subsidies (input) to one of specific assignments (output), which are  based on 
differentiated objectives and calculated with performance indicators, is gradually being 
adopted in the public sector. The results seem positive, but more refined explanations 
must be determined in a subsequent study, based on an analysis conducted with an 
expanded set of interviews.  
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Annexes 
1. The profile of the cantons: from the richest to the poorest 
 
2004-2014 data, BFS ZH GE VD VS UR 
Economic weight 
(GDP per inhabitants in  
Swiss francs ) 
92 553 104 914 67 159 53 867 48 733 
Geographic size 
 (km2) 
1 782.9 282.4 3 212.1 5 224.4 1 076.4 
Habitat and infrastructure 
surface % 
21.9 33.3 9.3 3.5 1.9 
Agricultural area in % 
 
41.7 39.5 42.4 19 24.2 
Forest area in %  30.4 12.4 32.1 24 20.1 
Number of municipalities 171 45 318 135 20 
Demographic density  
(km2) 
848 1 884 260.2 61.7 
 
33.8 
Number of inhabitants 1 408 575 463 101 734 356 321 732 35 693 
 
